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Abstract. The purpose of the paper is to assess the arguments of the critique of functionalism 
by Anthony Giddens and Norbert Elias. After being subject to severe criticism, terminology of 
functionalism is still a part of the lexicon of social scientists nowadays. Functionalist reasoning 
and concepts of functionalism are used in sociology, political science and economics, even 
though often without full awareness of its theoretical implications. Recent revival of interest in 
the works by Elias is connected with the search for a new theoretical and methodological 
foundation of sociology but his views on functionalism have remained largely unexplored. For 
the analysis presented in this paper, main theoretical works by Giddens and major works by 
Elias have been used. Positions of the authors have been analysed with respect to main concepts 
and principles of functionalism, such as function, needs, internalization of values, consensus, 
equilibrium, and the notions of power and individual. The study shows that while Giddens 
strived to reject functionalism and the concept of social function altogether, in the figurational 
approach developed by Elias it is possible to use some of the concepts of functionalism without 
necessarily accepting its controversial tenets.  
Keywords: equilibrium, function, functionalism, individual, interdependence, needs, power, 
society, values.  
 
Introduction 
 
Norbert Elias and Anthony Giddens developed distinctive approaches to 
sociological problems. Elias, a first-generation sociologist, according to his own 
characterization (Elias, 2009a), advocated the study of societies in historical 
perspective, while viewing humans in the plural, as a network of interdependent 
individuals, or figurations. The approach he originated is known as processual and 
figurational. Giddens in the late 1970’s proposed structuration theory, in which 
he tried to synthesize the developments in modern social theory, in particular 
structural and interpretative schools, while attempting to provide a solution to 
‘structure’ and ‘agency’ quandary. Elias and Giddens knew each other, as they 
were colleagues at the University of Leicester where they were working in the 
1960’s. Both were critical to functionalism but in different ways.  
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The works by Giddens represent one of the current grand syntheses in 
sociological theory but it is doubtful whether it has achieved its intended result, 
for the field is still characterised by divergent and conflicting approaches. In the 
past two decades there has been a revival of the interest in the works by Elias, 
which is evidenced, for example, by the growing number of publications which 
apply his approach (Gabriel, Mennell, 2011) and founding of the journal “Human 
Figurations” (2012) dedicated to the development of processual-figurational 
approach. The works of Elias are seen as providing inspiration and guidance for 
building a new theoretical foundation of sociology and for its future development 
(Dunning & Hughes, 2013).  
Critique of functionalism is a distinct element of Giddens’s theoretical 
writings. In the secondary literature on Elias it is pointed out that he has been 
critical to functionalism but it is often unnoticed that in fact he used the concepts 
associated with functionalism in a way which was consistent with his processual-
figurational approach. The purpose of this paper is to provide a comparative 
analysis of the critical views of Giddens and Elias on the concepts and principles 
of functionalism as contained in the major works of these authors, identifying 
similarities and differences in their positions on the matter. On the examples from 
the works of Elias it shows that concepts which are used in functionalism, such as 
function, needs and equilibrium, can be applied in social analysis outside of the 
functionalist paradigm.  
 
The concept of “harmonious whole” and value consensus 
 
Both Giddens and Elias were critical to the tendency contained in 
functionalism that societies are seen as self-contained entities with clear 
boundaries thought of by analogy with biological organism. They rejected the 
image of societies as “harmonious wholes” – as more or less stable systems 
composed of functionally interdependent parts. In normative functionalism, this 
conception presupposes moral consensus based on shared cultural values, 
socialization of individuals into this common culture, which ensures the 
internalization of these values (Parsons & Shils, 1962). The social order 
establishes the fit between the shared moral consensus and the motivation of 
individuals. For Giddens this view is not acceptable, it is ‘notoriously suspect’ 
and ‘at best partial’ view of society (Giddens, 2015: 124); the social systems are 
not so unified (Giddens, 1993: 130). Within the framework of this concept it is 
difficult to explain the existence of dissentions and divergent interpretations of 
the common value system. Norms and values are not just internalized. Norms can 
be an object of negotiation or conditional, pragmatic acceptance. Also, this 
conception is not useful for the explanation of conflicts between groups based on 
the clash of interests, as in class struggle (Ibid). The theorem “value consensus –
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norm – internalized need-dispositions” turns the human actors into ‘cultural 
dopes’ (Giddens, 1979: 71, 112). It leaves little room for reflexive, purposeful 
action of the individuals. 
For Elias, the presupposition that the social system is a harmonious whole 
also is not acceptable as a starting point of analysis or theory. For Elias, such a 
conception is an abstracted, idealized picture of 20th-century democratic state-
society. Elias also criticized functionalism for implicitly involving value 
judgement in considering something as functional or dysfunctional. Functional is 
something which is “good” for sustaining the integrity of the “whole”. “The 
inappropriateness of the evaluation is due to the fact that they tend – 
unintentionally – to use the terms for those tasks performed by one part of the 
society which are ‘good’ for the ‘whole’, because they contribute to the 
preservation and integrity of the existing social system” (Elias, 1978: 77). The 
concept of a ‘whole’ as applied to society is misleading and metaphysical (Elias, 
1978: 72). It is not useful for empirical research of social relationships.  
Elias criticized Talcott Parsons’s functionalism for creating a picture of 
society in the state of rest and ignoring the historical variability of social forms. 
The social system normally exists in a state of equilibrium, but when it is upset 
by a violation of norms, the social system strives to regain the balance. People 
obey the same norms and values through common socialization and are more or 
less equal (Elias, 2001: 467). Elias rejected this view because it is biased by 
focusing on the contemporary society, which is relatively more egalitarian and 
integrated than the societies in the past. The notion that society is an integrated 
system where people share the same norms and values is ahistorical. Such 
concepts are not realistic as models of pre-modern societies with “a high 
percentage of slaves or unfree subjects, or of feudal or hierarchical states – that 
is, societies in which not even the same laws, let alone the same norms and values, 
apply to all people” (Elias, 2001: 467-468).  
 
The concept of needs 
 
Giddens criticized functionalism for using the concept of the underlying 
society’s needs as an explanation for social phenomena. In functionalism, the 
needs are those prerequisites which must be met for the society to survive and the 
human action is explained as being directed, often unconsciously, by the 
imperative to satisfy those needs, such as integration, adaptation to the physical 
environment, allocation of resources and formulation of common goals. Thus 
apparently ‘irrational’ social practices such as a ‘rain dance’ in tribal societies are 
explained by the need to sustain the integration of the group. Giddens criticizes 
this concept of the need as applied to the social system. He argues that 
functionalism has been following too closely the analogy with the organic 
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systems, which can be said to have the interest in their own survival. Giddens 
claims the following: “Social systems, unlike organisms, do not have any need or 
interest in their own survival” (Giddens, 2015: 110). The idea that the social 
system has needs or reasons of its own is rejected by Giddens: “societies or social 
systems have no reasons or needs whatsoever” (Giddens, 1979: 211). As soon as 
it is posited that the social systems do not have needs or reasons, the reference to 
needs cannot serve as an explanation of the existence of practice: “Not even the 
most deeply sedimented institutional features of societies come about because 
those societies need them to do so” (Giddens, 1979: 113). The explanation of the 
existence of the institution should refer to the historical conditions of its 
appearance.  
If one holds the functionalist position about the latent needs and functions, 
then purposes of the individuals lose their relevance to the social action, which is 
unacceptable to Giddens. Human actors, through rationalization and reflexive 
monitoring of action, convert their wishes into purposes and intentions, the 
expected outcomes which they actively seek to achieve (Giddens, 2015: 125). 
Giddens argues that ‘needs’ are conscious to the individuals. In course of their 
practice, they employ knowledge about the effects of their actions to meet those 
needs. The only usage of the concept of needs he admits is ‘counterfactual’ – that 
is, these ‘needs’ are not the property of the system, but serve as a methodological 
device for the researcher (Giddens, 1978: 114).  
In the works of Elias there is a different treatment of the concept of needs. It 
is manifest in his concept of survival unit. Survival units are empirically 
identifiable collectivities such as tribes, city-states, empires, territorial, or nation-
states and they have an interest in securing their survival. In fact, what constitutes 
them is the interest in maintaining the capacity to defend themselves or attack 
other survival units (Elias, 1991). It cannot be deduced from his works that social 
needs are wholly unknown to the social actors but the degree of their awareness 
can vary, especially when knowledge of the needs in a more established system is 
compared to cognizance of new demands, which arise in the process of 
transformations of the figuration.  
Elias employs the concept of needs in explaining the genesis of the naval 
profession. But the reference to needs alone, as Elias points out, is not sufficient 
(Elias, 1950: 292). A new occupation is a manifestation of a new social function, 
which emerges in order to satisfy new human needs, which arise in conjunction 
with the development of technologies: “Human needs become differentiated and 
specific only in conjunction with specialized human techniques; these on their 
part emerge and crystallize into occupations only in view of potential and actual 
human needs” (Elias, 1950: 291-292). In his analysis the concepts of function and 
needs do not have the primacy; they are linked to the concepts of relationships 
and interdependence, so that the former are understood in conjunction with the 
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latter. A new occupation is not created by one individual, it is the outcome of the 
change of the situation in the ‘whole community’: “It is, in essence, a process of 
trial and error in which people attempt to match occupational techniques or 
institutions and human needs” (Elias, 1950: 292). The process of emergence and 
formalization of a new social function is usually accompanied by social tensions 
or conflicts among the groups occupying the particular social field which is 
followed by adjustments, compromises, trials and errors and finally 
accommodation between them, and institutionalization of the profession. This 
involves “people struggling, often in vain, to adjust their inherited institutional 
framework with all its incongruities to what they feel to be their own needs…” 
(Elias, 1950: 293). The naval profession in Europe emerged after the discoveries 
of the new lands on the other side of the Atlantic, which drew into competitive 
struggle England, Spain, Portugal, the Netherlands and France. That created the 
need for combination of competencies of the seamen and military men: “The new 
departure in maritime warfare created the need for people who in a new 
specialized form were seamen and military men at the same time” (Elias, 1950: 
296).   
In “The Civilizing Process” Elias explores the formation of the institution of 
tax collection based on the case of medieval France, in course of the Hundred 
Years’ War. Initially the king’s powers to collect taxes were very limited. It was 
not an established norm that the king had the right to raise taxes regularly. That 
was done on ad-hoc basis and such a right was given only for one year. It was 
opposed and disputed by the subjects of the realm, especially by the towns. But 
in the course of the war the need for regular taxation and the corresponding tax-
collecting institution was recognized and finally, after resolution of conflicts 
among the involved social groups, in particular, the king, nobility and the nascent 
bourgeoisie, it became permanent. Elias writes on the problem the following: “No 
single person created taxes or the taxation monopoly; individual, nor series of 
individuals throughout the century in which this institution was slowly formed1, 
worked towards this goal by any deliberate plan” (Elias, 2001: 348). Taxation was 
brought about as an outcome of the conflict among these various parties over 
resources and authority and then more consciously and deliberately this political 
instrument was given the form of a permanent institution.  
 
Equilibrium, balance and causal loops  
 
It is characteristic of functionalism that social systems tend to be seen as self-
regulating, maintaining the equilibrium between its component parts (Parsons & 
Shils, 1962). This idea serves as an explanatory device because the behaviour of 
                                                          
1 The fourteenth century (Author).  
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social subsystems are judged as functional or dysfunctional depending on their 
contribution to maintaining the overall system equilibrium. The explanation 
involves identification of causal loops. The system part has to be ‘functional’ to 
the system and has to adapt its behaviour accordingly, otherwise it will be 
‘negatively selected’. The behaviour of the unit of social action is readjusted 
through the feedback loop – if the consequences of the action are found to be 
positive, or functional, for the system maintenance, then it will be positively 
reinforced. As Stinchcombe puts it: if a selective causal connection between H 
[homeostatic variable] and S [structure or behaviour] exists, such that S’s are 
selected or reinforced if they maintain H, then S’s found in that situation will be 
more likely to be functional for maintaining H (Stinchcombe, 1968:88). In that 
sense the functionalists say that the cause of the behaviour is, indirectly, its 
consequence. The consequence or end which tends to be maintained functions 
indirectly as a cause of the behaviour or structure to be explained (Ibid). 
Giddens admits that in the social systems there are homeostatic processes, 
which are similar to those in mechanical or biological systems (Giddens, 1979: 
79). Unfortunately, he provides only a cursory treatment of such ‘blind’ 
homeostatic processes. One example that he mentions is a causal loop starting 
from material deprivation, leading to poor schooling, then to a low level of 
employment, which in turn leads back to material deprivation (Giddens, 1979: 79; 
1986: 289). But he asserts that social action involves self-consciousness and 
reflexivity, and these are more important than mere processes of self-regulation. 
Human agents are knowledgeable of the conditions of their actions, even though 
they may not fully comprehend all their consequences. Thus even the pupils 
involved in the negative causal loop mentioned above (the school ‘lads’) are not 
unaware of their situation and their prospective life-chances (Giddens, 1986: 293). 
Moreover, these negative causal loops can be recognized as such and acted upon 
by the governmental agency in order to break the vicious circle.  
Giddens is sceptical towards functionalists’ description of self-regulating 
processes in social systems because it ascribes teleology to the social system 
instead of treating the human agents as purposeful. He argues that there is no such 
entity as ‘structural explanation’ in social sciences, for all explanations should 
contain reference both to purposeful, reasoning individuals and structural 
constraints (Giddens, 1986: 179). 
It can be demonstrated, though, that Giddens does not completely escape the 
functionalist logic in his structuration theory. It is implied in his notions of 
ontological security and routine. Thus he explains much of social conduct by 
reference to the need to sustain the conditions of trust, or ontological security: “… 
there is a generalized motivational commitment to the integration of habitual 
practices across time and space” (Giddens, 1986: 64). He derives the need to 
sustain the conditions of trust from the need to control the ‘diffuse anxiety’, which 
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is “the most generalized motivational origin of human conduct” (Giddens, 1986: 
54). The importance of routines and routinization are derived from these basic 
socio-psychological needs. “The concept of routinization, as grounded in 
practical consciousness, is vital to the theory of structuration” (Giddens, 1986: 
60). This logic is not different from what Parsons and Shils wrote with respect of 
cultural norms: “… there is a tendency of systems of action to build up and 
maintain levels of consistency… The basis of this tendency rests in the functional 
need for order which underlies any action system, which entails the need for 
integration and its cultural components” (Parsons & Shils, 1962: 175). Without 
stability and complementarity of expectations, according to Parsons and Shils, the 
ego and alter cannot relate to each other in a mutually gratifying way. The 
difference is that for Parsons and Shils the homeostatic variable is order but for 
Giddens it is the ontological security, which, after all, are similar concepts.  
Elias warned against the use of biological analogies in the analysis of social 
processes, which is implicit in the model of homeostatic processes. Elias objected 
the view of society as a closed entity. He stressed that making account of the social 
processes requires investigation of the processes ‘inside’ the society as well as the 
external relationships with other societies. Moreover, the boundaries of the polity 
may be porous or fluid, which makes it difficult to ascertain what is ‘inside’ and 
what is ‘outside’ of the society.  
The concepts of balance and equilibrium are used in Elias’s works, but these 
are characterizations of empirical social processes and do not imply a social 
system’s teleology. On the contrary, he emphasized that the outcomes of the 
unplanned processes of social development and of figurational dynamics are not 
pre-determined. The concept of balance in his works often is used in association 
with the concept of power. Thus, there may be the balance of power among 
various social actors – between the states, the rulers and the ruled, employers and 
workers or between the sexes (Elias, 1978, 2001, 2009b).   
The concepts of balance and equilibrium often appear in his major work “The 
Civilizing Process”. There the balance of power is established between the 
emerging states, among the competing princes, between the king and the subjects 
and among the various groups making up the differentiating society. According 
to Elias’s theory of the civilizing processes, the growing differentiation, the 
division of labour results not simply in greater solidarity, but in ambivalent 
relationships: people not only increasingly become dependent on each other but 
also become competitors for the same opportunities. The growing 
interdependence results both in solidarity and hostility. Writing about the 
figuration of social forces at the end of the middle ages, he points out that the 
social groups “oscillate between the desire to win major advantages over their 
social opponents and their fear of ruining the whole social apparatus, on the 
functioning of which their actual social existence depends” (Elias, 2001: 319). He 
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considers that this is characteristic of societies with the developed division of 
functions: “different parts of society hold each other roughly in balance in terms 
of social strength” (Elias, 2001: 322). Then Elias makes a generalization saying 
that the equilibrium of tensions is characteristic of all societies: “Equilibrium in 
the field of tensions making up every society always arises in differentiated 
human networks through the collaboration and collision of a large number of 
groups and classes” (Elias, 2001: 323).  
The concept of equilibrium comes up in his discussion of the genesis of the 
institution of taxation. “Taxation”, writes Elias, “like any other institution, is a 
product of social interweaving. It arises (…) from the conflicts of the various 
social groups and interests…” (Elias, 2001: 248). He points out that the particular 
administrative organ for state finances (Chambre des Aides) during the Hundred 
Years’ War appeared, then under the pressure of social groups disappeared and 
then reappeared again. Summarizing this process, he notes: “Like a system of 
forces that has not yet reached equilibrium, society swayed back and forth 
between the various poles in the struggle of power” (Elias, 2001: 351)2. 
 
The term ‘function’ 
 
In his book “Central Problems of Social Theory” Giddens declared that he 
wanted to ‘ban’ the term ‘function’ from the social sciences. One reason, as 
pointed out above, is that the term ‘function’ presupposes that a social structure 
meets presumed needs of the social system, the existence of which Giddens 
rejects: “The term ‘function’ implies some sort of teleological quality that social 
systems are presumed to have: social items or activities are held to exist because 
they meet functional needs” (Giddens, 1986: 295). Another reason is that the use 
of the term ‘function’ creates an illusion of explanation of the phenomena, 
whereas in fact the term does not explain anything. Pointing out to the fit between 
a social practice and the presumed need of the system does not serve as an 
explanation. To say that the function of education system is to allocate the 
individuals to positions in the division of labour in the society is not to provide 
explanation or clarification. It remains to be explained to what extent the 
allocation of individuals to different jobs are intended or unintended 
consequences of the operation of educational system (Giddens, 1986: 297). The 
acceptable forms of explanation would involve references to the purposes of the 
actors and the unintended consequences of their actions. An explanation of the 
social phenomena must explicate the relationships between the elements which 
comprise the causal loop in the particular case (Giddens, 1979: 113).    
                                                          
2 It can be noted that the ideas of power struggle and ‘punctuated equilibrium’ are used in the explanation of the 
genesis of institutions in modern institutional analysis (Thelen, 2009). 
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It could be said that Elias criticized the use of the concepts of function in 
structural functionalism but not the concept as such, because he used it quite often 
himself. His critique was directed on the static, ahistorical character of this 
concept, as it was used by functionalists: “Immutability is treated as the normal 
condition of society. It is embedded in such basic sociological concepts as ‘social 
structure’ and ‘social function’” (Elias, 1978: 152). He was also critical to the idea 
of social “function” as a task which is performed by individuals or a group within 
a “harmonious ‘whole’” (Elias, 1978: 78).   
In “The Civilizing Process” he used the term ‘function’ in connection with 
the notion of the division of labour. So he speaks of progressive division of 
functions and concomitant economic development – urbanization, monetization 
and industrialization. In this process more and more people become functionally 
dependent on each other, as they perform the specialized tasks within the 
“network of differentiated social functions” (Elias, 2001: 434).  
Another use of the term ‘function’ refers to the position of the king. In course 
of the process of state formation, the position of the ruler gradually turned into a 
permanent function. Elias argues that when the interdependence of social groups 
and regions is slight, there is no much need in the central ruler except his role as 
a military leader and, occasionally, a judge (Elias, 2015: 315). The need for the 
central ruler becomes greater with the progressive division of labour and growth 
of complexity of society because that demands that more resources are devoted to 
coordination of activities (Elias, 2001: 314). As a result of subsequent institutional 
changes, the king becomes the ‘functionary’ of the society. 
In one of his later essays Elias attempted to enumerate “process universals” – 
the common structural features of all survival units, ranging from small bands of 
people to large modern states (Elias, 2009c). These are sets of “elementary 
functions” which the groups have to fulfil in order to survive. The first one is the 
economic function – the provision of food and other material necessities. The 
second one is the function of the control of violence within the group and also in 
relation to other groups. The third one is the function of production and 
transmission of knowledge or means of orientation – on human group can survive 
without it. The fourth one is the function of self-restraint; humans have to learn 
self-restraint in order to live in the society, as they lack inborn self-restraint. He 
stressed that this is an empirically verifiable model for the study of social 
processes, which can be tested and corrected (Elias 2009c). 
In his book “What is Sociology?” Elias introduces a relational concept of 
function. One group can be a “function” to another because of their 
interdependence. They need not be enclosed into a common “social system”, each 
performing complementary tasks or “functions” for each other. The rivalry 
between groups also make them interdependent, but in another way: in order to 
survive, these groups have to check each other’s actions and screen each other’s 
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intentions (Elias, 1978: 77). The antagonistic groups have to prepare to possible 
open conflict, or, as the case may be, to undertake preparations for war. In this 
context, the criteria of having a “function” is the interdependence of individuals 
or groups in the struggle for survival. 
 
The concept of power  
 
Another point of Giddens’s criticism of Parsons’s functionalism is a 
peripheral role of power that he assigns in his theory. Power, according to Parsons, 
is secondary to norms (Giddens, 1993: 26). Parsons defines power as a 
generalized legitimate capacity of the group in the societal system to implement 
collective goals. Legitimacy thus is implied in the definition of power. For 
Parsons, the main characteristic of power is its function – it serves the need of 
attaining the collectively valuable goals by taking binding decisions. Through the 
electoral process the politicians are given the mandate, the ‘grant of power’, which 
can be revoked in the next elections. If the trust and confidence in politicians are 
strengthened, the power is enhanced; if the trust diminishes, then power deflation 
occurs and it is necessary to bolster it with force and coercion.   
Giddens considers that Parsons overemphasized the significance of 
legitimation and consensus over the use of power in the social systems and 
generally underplayed the role of power in social affairs. Power, in his view, does 
not necessarily presuppose conflict, and here he agrees with Parsons. Power can 
be enhanced in the whole system and it is not just a zero-sum game. But it tends 
to involve contestation, when it is applied in social interaction in the form of 
domination. There may be disagreements over the goals as expressed in the 
conflicts of interests of different groups and competition and struggle over the 
incumbency of the power positions. Power can be defined generally as a 
transformative capacity of the social agents. It is a valuable and scarce asset, and 
thus invokes conflicts of interests. Power, in Giddens’s view, can be based on trust 
and confidence, but also on deception and manipulation: “If the use of power rests 
upon ‘trust’ and ‘confidence’, as Parsons emphasizes, it also frequently rests upon 
deceit and hypocrisy” (Giddens, 2015: 341). The real sources of power may reside 
outside of official politics and it is a mistake, therefore, to take the electoral 
politics at the face value, as Parsons does. 
Elias likewise considers power to be a basic, fundamental feature of social 
relations. But he criticized the sociological theories of power contemporary to 
him, including functionalism, by treating power as a sort of thing or substance 
rather than a structural aspect of social relationships. The concept of power in 
functionalism figures as a variable in a static system, while the more adequate 
concept of power, in Elias’s view, is that it emerges in the processes of social 
interweaving (Elias, 1978: 116). Power should be conceptualized as a 
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characteristic of relationship and thus ‘power ratio’ or ‘power balance’, in Elias’s 
view, are more preferable terms. He derives power from the concept of 
interdependence. In the system of interdependencies, some actors have greater 
relative strength while others are more dependent (Elias, 1978: 79). For example, 
in the absolutist state, the king and various social groups are interdependent, but 
the king, by virtue of his central position, is more powerful.  
 
Conceptualization of the individual 
 
Another point of Giddens’s criticism is that functionalism, in his view, treats 
intentional action unsatisfactorily: the structure and function dominate the subject, 
functionalism dispenses with the active individual (Giddens, 2015: 117). The 
concept of internalization of norms and values found in Parsons’s works make the 
individuals passive and conformist. This is not quite well compatible with the 
notion that the social life is actively constituted (Giddens, 1993: 26). Individuals 
do not figure in functionalism as creative, reflexive, skillful performers in 
interaction (Giddens, 1993: 165). Functionalism, in Giddens’s view, lacks the 
theory of action, despite its contrary claim. Parsons’s actors, according to 
Giddens, “are not capable, knowledgeable agents” (Giddens, 1978: 254). The 
concept of the agent that Giddens puts forwards presupposes that human actors 
know a great deal about the working of society. Individuals are not merely 
motivated, they have conscious intentions. In action and interaction, individuals 
use rules and resources, whereby reproducing social structures, but they also 
deliberately alter them, making interventions in the social world and producing 
new social structures. The individuals have the transformative capacity through 
employing the resources and using the rules, making them at the same time the 
object of transformation – that, in short, is the message of his structuration theory.  
Elias’s critique of Parsons’s functionalism in this respect is different. He 
criticizes this version of functionalism for improper conceptualization of 
individuals and society as two separate entities which exist in a state of rest. In 
the view of Elias, this approach is unsatisfactory in that it ignores the historical-
processual aspect of the problem. Parsons’s functionalism operates with a ‘closed’ 
concept of the ego – “homo clausus” – the image of the lonely individuals isolated 
from the social context. The result of this is a sharp dichotomy between 
personality and the social system. His approach to the problem involved the study 
of individualization as a historical process evolving over many centuries. In 
course of historical development, the salience of individualistic consciousness 
grows, but the identification with the collective ‘we’ is decreasing (Elias, 1991).  
According to the approach that he advocated, the object of sociological 
reflection should be people-in-society, people in plural, or ‘homines aperti’ 
(Perulli, 2011). His concept of figuration presupposes that individuals are 
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interdependent and therefore the actions and plans of the individuals cannot be 
seen as entirely freely chosen; these are explained by taking into account the 
compelling forces which individuals or groups exert upon each other by reason of 
their interdependence, be that enmity or cooperation.  
 
Conclusions 
 
In their works Giddens and Elias point to weaknesses and problematic 
assumptions of functionalism. Uncritical application of concepts and propositions 
found in functionalism, such as value consensus, individuals’ motivation as 
derived from internalization of values, the concept of society’s needs, power as a 
function of the collectivity, may lead to a one-sided view of social reality. 
Functionalism makes societies seem more stable than they really are. Explanation 
of social structures and behaviour by reference to the function they perform for 
the whole social system is not sufficient and may be misleading; it should be 
complemented or corrected by historical explanation, the study of combined 
effects of intended and unintended consequences of actions. Giddens even 
suggests to put the ban on the use of the term ‘function’ in social sciences. This 
proposal, however, is excessive.  
In the works of Elias the term ‘function’ is used in a way which is different 
from functionalism’s ‘hidden’ teleology. One can talk about ‘functions’ in the 
systems of the division of labour on the scale of organization or wider social units, 
the nation-state or international systems of cooperation. One can talk of the 
functions of the ‘attack-and-defence unit’ – the survival unit.  
The social scientist can make use of a more abstract, relational concept of 
function, as applied in the analysis of interdependencies, the human figurations, 
which might include both cooperative and inimical relationships. The concept of 
social needs can be understood as an emergent phenomenon of figurational 
dynamics – the changes in human interdependencies. These needs, or figurational 
pressures, can be recognized by the social actors to various degrees. Likewise, the 
concepts of balance and equilibrium can be detached from the pre-determined 
teleology of the social system. These can be used as descriptions of certain states 
in social figurations.   
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